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Abstract 
 
We present a simple framework in which both the exchange rates disconnect and forward 
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1. Introduction. 
 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) outlined an agenda for international macroeconomics 
centered on ‘six puzzles’.  The solution was to combine sticky prices and arbitrarily defined 
‘trade costs’.  To us, this seems more like despair rather than a solution.  This is not to deny 
that prices are not as volatile as some neo-classical models might suggest.  Nor is it to deny 
the importance of trade costs as evidenced in the survey by Anderson and Van Wincoop 
(2004).  However, both price volatility and trade costs are endogenous variables to be 
explained rather than assumed.  The contention of this paper is that the flexible price 
monetary model is adaptable enough to at least explain those puzzles that concern nominal 
magnitudes.  These are the exchange rate disconnect puzzle in its many manifestations and 
the seventh unmentioned puzzle - the forward bias problem1.  
Our modelling strategy is to extend Campbell and Cochrane (1999) preferences to 
both a monetary and an international setting.  With this specification there is an aggregate 
consumption externality (see for example Abel (1990) and Duesenberry (1949)) and utility is 
time-inseparable because of habit persistence.  The utility function depends not only on the 
consumption of domestic and foreign endowments but also on the surplus of consumption 
over externally generated volatile and persistent habits, in each good.  This makes the 
marginal rate of substitution between domestic and foreign goods volatile enough to explain 
the variability in real exchange rates.  The high volatility of nominal exchange rates follows 
since prices are pinned down by the modest volatility of the money stock.  The high 
correlation between real and nominal exchange rates also follows since variations in both 
have their common source in the ‘surplus consumption ratio’.  The disconnect between 
nominal exchange rates and fundamentals apparently arises because the persistence of surplus 
                                                 
1 Engel (2001) added the forward bias puzzle in his comment on the Obstfeld-Rogoff paper. 
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consumption is close to a unit root process.  This is also why our model replicates the Meese-
Rogoff puzzle.   
In the standard model, when the domestic interest rate is relatively low, the exchange 
rate is expected to appreciate.  The forward bias in our model arises because the preference 
specification has two motives for savings.  The first is the conventional desire to smooth 
consumption intertemporally.  The less familiar motive is a precautionary savings effect, 
which is dominant in our calibration of the model.  When times are relatively bad for the 
owner of the domestic endowment, the surplus consumption ratio for the domestic good is 
low in relation to that for the foreign good, the time-varying risk aversion measured in the 
domestic good is relatively high and the own interest rate is relatively low.  Consequently the 
holder of the domestic bond does not need to be compensated by as much of an expected 
appreciation and indeed may be content with an expected depreciation.  The latter case, 
which arises easily in our model, is why the forward bias occurs.    
The plan of the paper is as follows.  The next section discusses the related literature.  
In section 3 we present the stylised facts that we are trying to explain.  The theoretical 
framework is laid out and illustrated by way of an example in section 4.  Section 5 describes 
the calibration of the model while section 6 discusses the results.  The final section makes 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Related literature. 
 
One of the striking features of the literature is that it is rare indeed for any paper to try 
to solve the exchange rate disconnect puzzle, real exchange rate volatility and the forward 
bias problem at the same time.  This is surprising because the need to explain the extent of 
nominal exchange rate volatility is common to all three.  An exception to this is the review 
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paper by Sarno (2005).  He argues that that non-linear adjustment is the key to understanding 
all three.  This is consonant with the view expressed here.  
Evans and Lyons (2002) and Killeen, Lyons and Moore (2006) have presented one of 
the most radical ways of explaining the exchange rate disconnect problem.  They draw 
inspiration from the finance microstructure literature and argue that spot returns are 
determined by foreign exchange order flow.  Evans and Lyons (2005) have developed this 
approach inside a general equilibrium framework though they are silent on the forward bias 
problem. 
 It has already been mentioned that Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) do not even consider 
the forward bias problem as a major puzzle.  Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) show that 
with price stickiness for at least four quarters, very low levels of the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution, a shock to money growth that is much larger than empirically observed and a 
high cross-country correlation in shocks to money growth, their international business cycle 
model produces simulated moments that broadly mimic the properties of real and nominal 
exchange rates.  Rather surprisingly for a sticky price model, they find it difficult to match 
the lack of variability in the international price ratio.  However, they do not approach the 
subject of the forward bias.  In fact, Engel (1999) has shown that the new open economy 
macroeconomics has little to contribute on the forward bias problem. 
Moore and Roche (2005, 2007) have already applied Campbell and Cochrane (1999) 
preferences to address some aspects of the exchange rate disconnect problem but do not 
consider the forward bias puzzle2.  Verdelhan (2006) attempts to explain the forward bias 
puzzle using Campbell and Cochrane (1999) preferences in a non-monetary economy with 
trade costs.  It is difficult to interpret this because real interest rates cannot be observed so 
that it is not clear if there is a real analogue to the forward bias problem in the data.  
                                                 
2 An earlier application of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) preferences to the forward bias problem by Moore 
and Roche (2002) was inconclusive.  The present paper succeeds because it allows real interest rates to vary.  
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Obviously, the exchange rate disconnect problem and the relationship between real and 
nominal exchange rates cannot be addressed in a non-monetary setting.  We can show that the 
Verdelhan (2006) result can be obtained as a special case of our analysis. 
The literature that studies the forward bias problem in isolation is vast and we can 
only touch on some of the more relevant recent developments here3.  The first point is that 
recent research has suggested that the forward bias (or equivalently the uncovered interest 
parity puzzle) does not always occur4.  Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) show that the UIP 
problem is a feature which arises between developed countries and is much less likely to arise 
between emerging and developed countries.  Frankel and Poonawala (2004) find a similar 
result.  Our model can account for this.  Chinn and Meredith (2004) show that UIP is only 
violated for short maturity bonds between G7 countries.  For longer maturity bonds, the 
negative coefficient does not arise and is closer to one than zero.  Alexius (2001) finds a 
similar result.  In our model uncovered interest parity is a short-run problem.   
In an affine setting, Backus, Foresi and Telmer (2001) show that it is not, in general, 
possible to solve the forward bias puzzle in a rational no arbitrage setting unless (1) interest 
rates can theoretically assume negative values or (2) domestic and foreign interest rates 
respond asymmetrically to multiple state variables.  Our paper is very definitely in the former 
category but we find that the negative interest problem in our case is not empirically very 
serious5.   
Alvarez, Atkinson and Kehoe (2005) explain the forward bias by permitting a time 
varying degree of asset market participation.  They explain the forward bias; they match the 
persistence of the forward premium and the lack of persistence of spot returns.  The 
calibrated model displays a volatility of spot returns that is more than 60% higher and 
volatility of forward premium that is more than 60% lower than are observed in the data.  
                                                 
3 The classic survey is Engel (1996).  Sarno (2005) contains a good update.   
4 Chinn (2006) reviews those examples where UIP does hold. 
5 Full details are available on request. 
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They do not address the exchange rate disconnect puzzle at all.  From our reading of the 
model, we suspect that the implications for the volatilities of prices and real exchange rates 
may be counterfactual.  The price ratio is likely to be too volatile and negatively correlated 
with nominal exchange rates leaving the real exchange rate volatility too low.   
Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) find that the forward bias problem can be explained by 
using ‘distorted beliefs’ about interest rate processes.  Fisher (2006) also explains the bias 
using heterogeneous prior beliefs.  Bachetta and Van Wincoop (2005) find that the forward 
bias arises due to rational expectation errors.  These arise because some investors are 
constrained by information processing costs.  The fraction of “rationally inattentive” 
investors varies endogenously.  In a related paper, Carlson and Osler (2005) introduce a 
mixture of financial agents and commercial agents.  Commercial agents have a demand for 
foreign exchange that is driven by good markets conditions only.  The breakdown between 
the two types of agents is endogenous.  They successfully replicate the forward bias puzzle.  
The strength of our approach is its simplicity: all agents are rational and have rational 
expectations at all times. 
 
3. The stylised facts. 
 
We model many exchange rate puzzles in this paper.  For ease of digestion we split 
them into four groups (1) “exchange rate disconnect” facts, (2) volatility and persistence of 
real and nominal exchange rates, (3) relative volatility and persistence of spot and forward 
exchange rates and (4) forward rate unbiasedness.    
Our first group of facts relate to exchange rate disconnect puzzles.  Many economists 
have found it difficult to explain why the random walk exchange rate model outperforms many 
other models in short horizon forecasting (see Meese and Rogoff (1983)).  Typically the root 
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mean squared forecast error (RMSE) is estimated for both the monetary and random walk 
forecasting models and their ratio is calculated.  The ratio of the RMSE of the monetary 
model to the driftless random walk model tends to be greater than unity at most forecast 
horizons.  Mark (1995) and Faust, Rogers and Wright (2003) estimate the following exchange 
rate equation at forecast horizon k 
  (1) 2~ (0, )+ − = α +β + σt k t k k t t t es s z e e iid ,
.ts
where zt is the log deviation of the exchange rate from fundamentals predicted by the “monetary 
model” and is given by 
  (2) 1 2 1 2( ) ( )= − − + − −t t t t tz y y m m
where jty  and  are real output and the nominal money supply for country j respectively.  In 
these studies they compute recursive out of sample forecasting exercises and produce forecasts 
for horizons 1, 4, 8, 12 and 16 quarters.  Using real time data Faust, Rogers and Wright (2003) 
show that the relative RMSE was greater than unity and increasing with the forecast horizon for 
three out the four US dollar exchange rates studied
j
tm
6.  An example of their results is reproduced 
as Table 1.  In a related set of facts many have estimated relationships such as  
 1 2 1 2 20 1 2( ) ( ) ~ (0, ).= α + α − + α − + σt t t t t t ts y y m m e e iid e
                                                
 (3) 
Numerous writers have pointed out how difficult it is to obtain cointegration from equations 
such as (3) or to even obtain sensible estimates of its parameters.  There is a good survey of 
such work included in Taylor (1995).   
 The second set of facts that we consider concerns the volatility and persistence of real 
and nominal bilateral exchange rates between the United States and other countries.  Many 
 
6 Famously, Mark (1995) finds that as the forecast horizon increases, the Meese-Rogoff problem declines in 
severity and that the monetary model beats the random walk model.  Faust, Rogers and Wright (2003) challenge 
this result in the following terms: “Had Mark (1995) constructed his dataset at almost any other time than early 
1992, he would have found much less evidence of predictability.  There is only a 2-year window around Mark’s 
vintage in which the monetary model beats the random walk for both the DM and yen.  That results like this 
arise from time to time is perhaps not surprising in an area where many researchers independently fit many 
models to each successive vintage.  Only significant results are published.  This sort of process seems likely to 
raise familiar data-mining problems” 
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studies have reported these facts.  For example Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) use 
quarterly Hodrick-Prescott filtered data that cover the floating period 1973:1 to 2000:1 for 
many European countries.  They report that the standard deviation of the real and nominal 
exchange rates are between 6.08%-9.08%, the first order autocorrelation coefficient of the 
real and nominal exchange rates are between 0.77-0.87 and the correlation coefficient 
between the two exchange rates are between 0.96-0.997.  They also report that international 
consumer price ratios are much less variable than either real or nominal exchange rates and 
are in the 1.17%-2.29% range.  The first order autocorrelation coefficient for the price ratio is 
as high as that found for the exchange rates and ranges from 0.74-0.92. 
Clearly at business cycle frequencies real and nominal exchange rates are volatile, 
persistent and highly correlated with each other.  Basic statistics for logged Hodrick-Prescott 
filtered real and nominal exchange rates are reported in Table 2.  The stylised facts for our 
data are very similar to those reported by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002).  Basic 
statistics for logged first-differenced real and nominal exchange rates are reported in Table 3.  
It is evident that first-differenced real and nominal exchange rate changes display similar 
volatility, lack persistence and are highly correlated with each other. 
Many authors have presented the third set of stylized facts: those for spot and forward 
exchange rates8.  As a reminder we present some statistics in Table 4.  Like previous authors, 
we find that the standard deviation of the forward discount is smaller than that of expected 
forward speculative profit and is an order of magnitude less than that of the spot return.  The 
second is that the AR(1) coefficient of the spot return is close to zero while the forward 
discount is very persistent.   
The final set of facts focuses on the forward bias problem directly.  The coefficient on 
the forward discount from a regression for predicting spot return in the following regression  
                                                 
7 See Table 1 in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002). 
8 See Hodrick (1987), Backus, Gregory and Telmer (1993) and Bekaert (1996) for example. 
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 1 1 1( )t t t t ts s a b f s u+ 1+− = + − +  (4) 
is reported by many researchers to have a negative sign (see the references in the last 
footnote).  In (4)  is the log of the spot exchange rate andts tf  is the log of the one period 
forward exchange rate.  In Table 4 we present the fact, that for all major developed countries, 
the estimate of the coefficient  is negative rather than the unity suggested by a simple 
understanding of the rational expectations efficient markets hypothesis.  Since covered 
interest rate parity holds 
1b
(4) can be interpreted as an uncovered interest rate parity regression 
equation.  The two necessary Fama conditions for a negative  are that the covariance 
between the expected forward speculative profit and the expected spot return is negative and 
that the variance of expected forward speculative profit exceeds the variance of the expected 
spot return.  The evidence supporting these facts is also presented in Table 4.    
1b
 
4. The model. 
 
4.1 The basic framework 
 
The structure of the model is the well-known Lucas (1982) two-country, two-good, 
two-money representative agent story.  The utility function9 to be maximized is: 
 
1 1 (1 ) 2 2 (1 )
0
( ) ( )
1 1
t t t t t
t
t
C H C HE
γ γ
β γ γ
− −∞
=
⎛ ⎞⎧ ⎫− −+⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬− −⎩ ⎭⎝ ⎠∑  (5) 
subject to the equation of motion for wealth : tW
                                                 
9 The superscript denotes country of origin of the good.  Uppercase letters denote variables in levels; lowercase 
letters denote variables in log levels, including growth and interest rates.  Greek letters without time subscripts 
denote parameters.  Bars over variables denote steady states.  We assume that the parameters in the model are 
identical for both countries.  This is not essential to the model but we have not found it necessary to emphasize 
cross-country parameter differences.  Because of this and for simplicity of exposition, we present the problem 
for the home country (country 1) representative agent only.  Country 2 is the foreign country. 
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1 1
2 1
1 1 1 1( ) ( )
t t
t t t t tW S A A P Y
τ τ
τ τ
+ +
+ + + +
∈Τ ∈Τ
= + 1 1t+∑ ∑  (6) 
and the wealth constraint: 
 
1 1
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 1( , ) ( ) ( , ) (
t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t tW P C S P C Q A S Q A
τ τ
1)τ τ τ τ τ τ
+ +
+ + +
∈Τ ∈Τ
= + + +∑ ∑ +
)
 (7) 
Households consume home and foreign goods and purchase state contingent nominal bonds 
1
1( tA τ + , each of which pays off one unit of home currency in state 1tτ +  and 2 1( tA )τ + , each of 
which pays off one unit of foreign currency in state 1tτ + .  Τ  is the set of all possible states.   
In (5) β  is the discount factor, γ  is a curvature parameter,  is consumption of 
goods and services of country j and  is the subsistence consumption (or habit) of goods 
and services of country j.  Note that, if  is set to zero then 
j
tC
j
tH
j
tH (5) collapses to standard 
addilog preferences with no habit.  We assume that is the same for both countries: 
this highlights a feature of our modelling strategy, that habits are goods rather than country 
specific.  Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) argue that the case for modelling habit 
formation at the level of individual goods, as we have, is at least as compelling as the 
traditional approach of modelling habits as an aggregate phenomenon only.  They refer to this 
preference specification as `deep habit formation'.  Their analysis concerns the cyclical 
behaviour of mark-ups but they show that the demand side of the macro economy is 
indistinguishable from that pertaining to an environment in which agents have traditional or 
what they call ‘superficial’ habits.  In 
j
tH    j=1,2
(6) and (7) 1tW +  is wealth next period in country ,  is 
the level of the spot exchange rate,  is the price level country j,  is the endowment in 
country 1 and  is the nominal bond price in the currency of country j of 
state 
tS
j
tP
1
tY
1( , )  1,
j
t tQ iτ τ+ = 2
1tτ +  bonds. 
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Habit persistence takes the form of an aggregate consumption externality i.e. 
“Keeping up with the Jones’s” effects along the lines of Duesenberry (1949) and Abel 
(1990).  Recent work in the economics of happiness literature suggests that relative income is 
an important factor in individuals’ levels of satisfaction; see for example Oswald and Clarke 
(1996) and Oswald (1997).  Chetty and Szeidl (2004) provide a compelling non-
psychological argument for an aggregate habit externality.  In their model, habit-like 
behaviour can arise from the rigidities inherent in the consumption of “commitment goods”.  
These are goods the consumption of which often cannot be changed in the short run.  
Aggregating an economy of heterogeneous households with standard, non-habit preferences 
over such commitment goods yields aggregate dynamics that coincide precisely with the 
representative consumer economy of Constantinides (1990) with the exception that habit 
formation is external as we assume in this paper. 
We assume the usual cash in advance constraint: 
 , 1= =
j
jt
tj
t
M C j
P
,2  (8) 
where jtM  is the a quantity of the currency of country j. It is easy to model money as part of 
the utility function.  Feenstra (1986) shows that the cash-in-advance framework is a special 
case of money-in-the utility function where the real balance component of utility takes the 
Leontief form.  It is encouraging to report that the results in this paper only require the 
simplest possible monetary specification. 
We assume an external habit specification.  We define: 
 , 1−=
j j
j t t
t j
t
C HX
C
,2=j  (9) 
where jtC  is aggregate consumption per capita of goods and services of country j rather than 
individual consumption: it does not affect individual choice at the margin and jtX  is the 
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surplus consumption ratio.  Identical individuals choose the same level of consumption in 
equilibrium, so =jtC C jt .  Like Lucas (1982) there is perfect international risk pooling in 
equilibrium10. This is a result of our assumption that households can purchase state 
contingent nominal bonds as in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002).  Under this assumption, 
consumption of each good equals half of the current endowment and in the remainder of the 
paper we will use consumption and endowment interchangeably.11   
The log of the surplus consumption ratios evolve as follows: 
 ( ) ( )1 (1 ) , 1,2,j j j jt t t tx x x x v jφ φ λ+ = − + + =1+  (10) 
whereφ <1, is the habit persistence parameter, x is the steady state value for the logarithm of 
the surplus consumption ratio which we define below in equation (12) and  is the shock to 
endowment growth.  The function
1
j
tv +
( )jtxλ describes the sensitivity of the log surplus 
consumption ratio to endowment innovations.  It depends non-linearly on the current log 
surplus consumption ratio:   
 
max
max
2
max
1 2( )
( ) 1 for 1,2,
0 for
1where .
2
j
j jt
t t
j
t
x x
x x x
X
x x
Xx x
− −λ = − ≤ =
= >
−= +
j
 (11) 
where X is the steady state value of the surplus consumption ratio and is defined as: 
 ( )1
vX γσγ φ δ= − −  (12) 
where (1 ) .γ φ δ− >  This is an alternative given in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), which 
allows for some variation in real interest rates.  Specifically, they show that the parameter δ  
monitors the sensitivity of real interest rates to the surplus consumption ratio: 
                                                 
10 Recent work by Brandt, Cochrane and Santa-Clara (2006) suggests that international risk sharing is very high. 
11 The solution to the optimization problem is laid out in appendix (A1). 
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 ( )= − −r rt ti i x xδ  (13) 
where  is the real rate of interest and rti
ri  is its steady state value12. The local curvature of the 
utility function with respect to good j is: 
 
( )
( )
,
1,2
,
j j
cc t tj
tj j j
t c t t
U C H
C
X U C H
γ = − =j  (14) 
At the steady state, it is easy to show that (14) is: 
 (1 )
vX
γ φ δγ
σ
− −=  (15) 
This expression is positively related to the coefficient of relative risk aversion for the one 
good case13.  For convenience, we will refer to (14) as the own-good risk aversion. 
Though there is no difficulty in doing so, forward contracts are not modelled 
explicitly because all a proper modelling would lead to is covered interest parity.  So we 
simply assume the latter and define the forward rate as: 
 
2
1
t t
t
t
q SF
q
=  (16) 
 
where  and  are the risk-free nominal bond prices in home and foreign currency prices 
respectively.
1
tq
2
tq
14
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 For further details see equation (A13) and the discussion that follows it in Appendix (A3). 
13 Defining risk aversion in a multi-good model is not trivial (see Engel, 1992 and Moore, 1997).  An 
intertemporal model has as many goods as time periods.  In addition, our model has two goods in each time 
period.  We evade this problem because we assume below that the home and foreign endowment shock 
variances are the same. 
 
14 See the definitions in equations (A2) and (A3) in Appendix A1. 
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4.2 A worked example 
 
The easiest way to illustrate the potential of the model is to make specific assumptions 
about the underlying stochastic processes and to follow through the implications.  We assume 
that consumption or endowment growth and money growth follow simple AR(1) processes:  
 21 1 1(1 ) , ~ (0, ), 1,2
j j j j
t t t t vc c v v Nμ μρ μ ρ σ+ + +Δ = − + Δ + =j  (17) 
and 
 21 1 1(1 ) , ~ (0, ), 1,2
j j j j
t t t t um m u u Nπ πρ π ρ σ+ + +Δ = − + Δ + =j  (18) 
respectively.  The unconditional means of consumption and money growth are defined as μ and 
π  respectively.  The variances of shocks to consumption and money growth are defined as 2vσ  
and 2uσ respectively.  We also assume that the shocks to consumption and money growth are 
uncorrelated15.   
 
4.2.1 Volatility of real  and nominal exchange rates 
 
From equations (A1) and (A4) in Appendix (A1), the log of the real and nominal 
exchange rates are: 
 ( ) ( )1 2 1 2= − + −t t t tr c c x xγ γ t  (19) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 21= − − − + − + −t t t t t ts c c x x mγ γ tm
)
 (20) 
respectively16.  The only way that equations (19) and (20) differ from standard addilog 
preferences are in the terms in ( 1 2−t tx x .  This is the difference in the surplus consumption 
                                                 
15 For what follows, we also set the persistence of real shocks to zero (as is often found for the growth rate in 
seasonally adjusted U.S. real consumption of non-durables and services per capita).  
16 Strictly speaking, this is the terms of trade and the real exchange rate is the relative price of non-traded to 
traded goods.  In this respect, the analysis follows Finn (1999) and Bergin and Feenstra (2001).  Mendoza 
(1995) compares the stylised facts of real exchange rates to those of the terms of trade.  For example, the former 
is somewhat more volatile than the latter.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) also show that the correlation between 
 14
ratios between domestic and foreign goods.  Moore and Roche (2002, 2005) also show that 
the cross-good difference in the log surplus consumption ratio is very volatile in comparison 
to the other terms in (19) and (20), the so-called real and nominal fundamentals.  From 
Appendix (A2), the variance of spot returns is:  
 ( ) 22 2 2 2 21 22 (1 ) 11 ut t x vVar s s Xπ
σ γφ γ σ σρ+
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− = + − + −⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎜ − ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎟⎟  (21) 
When the variance of the surplus consumption ratio, 2xσ , is large, it dominates the expression 
in equation (21).  Similarly, the variance of real exchange rate changes is: 
 ( ) 22 2 2 21 2 (1 )t t x vVar r r X
γφ γ σ σ+
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− = − +⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎟⎟  (22) 
 
Again sufficiently large 2xσ  can dominate (22) and render the volatility of real exchange rate 
changes comparable to its nominal counterpart.  Finally, in the standard addilog model, the 
correlation coefficient between real and nominal exchange rate changes is determined by 
whether the curvature parameter γ  is greater than or less than unity.  In our model, the main 
feature governing this correlation is the relative importance of surplus consumption in 
equations (19) and (20). 
 
 
4.2.2 Exchange Rate Disconnect Puzzle 
 
It is not hard to see whence the exchange rate disconnect problem comes.  The volatilities of 
real and nominal exchange rates are dominated by the volatility of the surplus consumption 
ratio.  It is also easy to see from equation (10) that that the persistence of the surplus 
consumption ratio is governed by the parameter φ  which Campbell and Cochrane (1999) 
argue should be close to unity.  This is what drives the Meese and Rogoff (1983) puzzle 
                                                                                                                                                        
nominal exchange rates and the terms of trade is weaker than that which typically characterises the comovement 
of nominal and real exchange rates.  Nevertheless, all of the same qualitative stylised facts apply to both 
measures. 
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because omitting the unobservable but volatile surplus consumption ratio from equations 
such as (1) makes forecasting very imprecise.  We can also see why attempts to find 
cointegration in equation (3) have apparently led to many rejections of the monetary model.  
The presence of near-unit root processes in (19) and (20) reduces the power of the 
cointegration tests.  It also reduces the power of tests of estimates of the parameters (see 
Elliot (1998)). 
 
4.2.3 Forward Bias Puzzle 
 
It is straightforward to explain how the forward bias actually arises.  From Appendix 
(A3), equation (A16), it is clear that the nominal interest rate on country j’s bonds at time t is: 
 ( )= + Δ + −j j jt t ti m xπα ρ θ jx  (23) 
 
where the constants α  and θ  are defined in equations (A17) and (A18) respectively.  
Variations in nominal rates are determined by monetary factors and a real term that is a 
multiple of the deviation of the surplus consumption ratio from its mean.  In general, θ  can 
take any sign.  When it is zero, the precautionary savings motive is exactly offset by the 
normal intertemporal substitution motive for savings.  This means that nominal interest rates 
are determined by the Fisher Open Condition.  We will show below that uncovered interest 
parity also holds in this case.  However, the interesting case occurs when θ  is positive.  In 
this case the precautionary savings motive dominates the intertemporal substitution effect.  
When the surplus consumption ratio in the domestic good is low, risk aversion in terms of the 
domestic good is high, agents need little incentive to hold domestic bonds and the domestic 
nominal interest rate is low.  If this effect is strong enough, (i.e. θ  is sufficiently positive), 
agents do not need to be compensated for low yields by an expected currency appreciation 
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and may even be prepared to accept an expected depreciation.  This is the forward bias 
problem in a nutshell. 
Obviously, the forward bias problem means that the coefficient  in equation 1b (4) 
must be negative.  Fama’s first necessary condition for this result concerns the covariance 
between expected forward profits and the expected spot return.  From Appendix (A4), this is 
 ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 21 1, 2 1 1t t t t t tCov f E s E s s xγ φ γ φ θ σ+ +⎡ ⎤− − = − − −⎣ ⎦ +  (24) 
It is shown in Appendix (A3) that ( )1γ φ θ− +  is positive so long as risk aversion exceeds 
unity.  Consequently, the covariance in (24) is always negative, meeting Fama’s condition.  
 Fama’s second necessary condition for a negative  is that the variance of the 
expected forward profit (equation 
1b
(A24)) is greater than the variance of the expected spot 
return (equation (A22)).  The ratio of the two variances is: 
 ( )( )( )
( )( )2 21
2 2
2 21
2
1
(1 )
1
xt t t
ut t t 2
x
Var f E s
Var E s s π
π
γ φ θ σ
ρ σ γ φ σρ
+
+
− +− =− + −−
 (25) 
 
The higherθ , the more likely that Fama’s condition holds.  By contrast, the higher the 
conditional variance of money growth,
2 2
21
uπ
π
ρ σ
ρ− , the more likely  is positive.  The latter is 
most plausible in countries which have unsophisticated institutions and are prone to 
hyperinflation.    
1b
The slope coefficient  is derived in Appendix (A4) as equation 1b (A26).  It is repeated 
here for convenience: 
 
( )2 2 22
1 2 2
2 2
2
1
1
1
u
x
u
x
b
π
π
π
π
ρ σ γ φ θσρ
ρ σ θ σρ
− −−=
+−
 (26) 
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The sign is ambiguous.  If 0θ = , the slope is unity and UIP holds.  A necessary condition for 
a negative  is that 1b 0θ > .  In the case where the persistence of money growth shocks πρ  is 
zero, the slope simplifies to:  
 ( )1γ φθ
− −
 (27) 
In this case, 0θ >  is necessary and sufficient for a negative slope17.  More generally, the 
slope is most likely to be negative the less important are monetary factors.  If the conditional 
variance of money growth is sufficiently high, then a positive slope will be obtained even if 
0θ > .  This explains why UIP is more likely to hold when developing countries are 
considered as reported in Bansal and Dalquist (2000).   
 
5. Calibration 
 
We choose some of the parameters in the model by estimating them using data from the 
United States.  Other parameter values are taken from the literature.  The remaining 
parameters are chosen so that that the steady state surplus consumption ratio is approximately 
5% as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and that local risk aversion is no more than 10.  We 
believe that the level of local risk aversion of 35, in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), is too 
high. 
We need to choose time series data to proxy for endowments and money.  We follow 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) who use seasonally adjusted real consumption expenditure on 
non-durables and services per capita to proxy for endowments in the United States.  The 
following parameters for consumption growth rates are taken from Campbell and Cochrane 
(1999).  The unconditional mean μ  is set equal to 0.4725% per quarter.  The AR(1) 
                                                 
17 This is the slope that Verdelhan (2006) reports.  To obtain this, he had to assume substantial trade costs: our 
‘deep habits’ approach makes this unnecessary.  In addition, it is difficult to see how Verdelhan can be 
generalized to a monetary setting.  This is necessary to address the full range of puzzles considered in this paper.  
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coefficient of consumption growth μρ  is set to zero.  The standard deviation of shocks to 
consumption vσ  is set to 0.75% per quarter. 
Typically either the base money or M1 is used for the money stock.  We follow 
Christiano (1991) who used base money in a closed economy model with a cash-in-advance 
constraint.  The parameters of money per capita growth rates are estimated using an AR(1) 
process.  The base money data for the U.S. are quarterly and available for the period 1959:1-
2005:4 from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database.  The unconditional mean of 
money growth per capita π  is estimated to be 1.36% per quarter.  The AR(1) coefficient of 
money growth per capita is estimated to be 0.20 with a t-statistic based on Newey-West 
standard errors of 1.57.  Thus at conventional significance levels one cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that πρ  is zero.  In the baseline parameterization we set these to πρ  to 0.1, which 
is within the estimated 95% confidence interval.  In sensitivity analysis we also set πρ  to 
zero.  The standard deviation of shocks to money growth uσ  is estimated to be 0.946% per 
quarter.   
There are four more parameters to choose.  These are the discount factor β, the 
sensitivity of the real interest rate to the surplus consumption ratio δ, the AR(1) coefficient of 
the log of the surplus consumption ratio φ, and the power parameter in the utility function γ.  
Since we are going to simulate a quarterly artificial economy we choose β = 0.99, a value 
commonly used in the literature.  The parameter δ has to be negative for the precautionary 
savings motive to dominate the intertemporal substitution savings motive for savings.  In the 
baseline parameterization we set δ = -.005.  For our sensitivity analysis we also set δ = -.0025.  
We choose γ and φ so that the surplus consumption ratio is approximately 5% and that the value 
of local risk aversion is no more than 10.  Thus in the baseline parameterization we set γ=0.5 
and φ=0.999.  For our sensitivity analysis we also set φ=0.995 and γ=0.7 (a value used to match 
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the Sharpe ratio in Campbell and Cochrane (1999)).  The baseline parameterization is 
summarized in Table 5.  
 
6. Results 
 
We simulated the model 1000 times generating 132 observations for each series.  The 
results for the moments of interest are presented in Tables 6-10.  Where appropriate we 
present the mean of the simulated moment and its standard error (in parenthesis).  In Table 6 
we present the relative RMSE of the monetary model in out-of-sample forecasting in the 
theoretical economy.  The nominal exchange rate is generated using equation (20).  We 
follow Faust et al’s (2003) choice of the nominal exchange rate fundamentals in the 
forecasting exercise, namely the cross-country money and consumption differentials.  Thus in 
this experiment we are examining the effect on the relative RMSE of omitting the cross-good 
difference in the log surplus consumption ratio in the nominal exchange rate fundamentals.  It 
is evident from the second column in Table 6 that the relative RMSE is greater than unity and 
increases with the forecast horizon, just as in the data.  Thus our model is capable of 
producing the general result from Meese and Rogoff (1983).  Our suggestion is that this is 
due to the fact that an important real variable is omitted from the nominal exchange rate 
fundamentals, namely the cross-good difference in the log surplus consumption ratio.  These 
results do not change very much when we perform sensitivity analysis reported in columns 3-
6 in Table 6. 
The exchange rate disconnect puzzle also manifests itself in the cointegration 
literature with the common finding that the nominal exchange rate does not appear to be 
cointegrated with the fundamentals from the monetary model.  Omitting the cross-good 
difference in the log surplus consumption ratio from the fundamentals may cause this result.  
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In order to investigate this we conducted two simple experiments.  In each we followed Mark 
(1995) and Faust et al. (2003) and use the cross-country money and consumption differentials 
as fundamentals for the nominal exchange rate.  In the first experiment we assume that the 
cointegrating vector is plus unity on the cross-country money differential and minus unity on 
the cross-country consumption differential.  The residual is tested for a unit root (no 
cointegration) using an augmented Dickey-Fuller test where the lag length in the test regression 
is chosen by reduction methods.  The null hypothesis of no cointegration between the nominal 
exchange rate and cross-country money and consumption differentials is only rejected 20.7% 
of the time despite the fact that they are cointegrated by construction in the model.   
tz
In the second experiment we estimate a linear relation relationship (3) by FM-OLS.  
The residual  is tested for a unit root.  The null hypothesis of no cointegration between the 
nominal exchange rate and cross-country money and consumption differentials is rejected 
45.4% of the time.  We also conduct a Wald test of the joint null hypothesis H
ˆte
0:α1 = γ-1 and α2 
= 1 in equation (3).  The null is rejected in 71.8% of the 1,000 replications.  This result is 
commonly found in the data (see Taylor (1995)).  The main reason for our results is that a very 
volatile and near integrated variable is omitted from the cointegrating relationship.  These 
results are not very sensitive to the values of φ, γ and δ.   
A final way our model throws light on the exchange rate disconnect puzzle is the fact 
that some researchers have suggested that the volatility of the fundamentals is not enough to 
produce the volatility in the nominal exchange rate (see for example Flood and Rose (1999)).  
We disagree.  In the model the standard deviation of the Hodrick-Prescott filtered and first-
differenced logged nominal exchange rate is 7.98% and 6.36% respectively.  These results 
are presented in column 2 of Tables 8 and 9 respectively.  These are similar in magnitude to 
what is found in the data (see Tables 2 and 3).  The standard deviation of the price ratio is in 
the range found in the data as reported in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002).  The standard 
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deviation of the exchange rates is higher if we increase γ, make δ larger in absolute terms, or 
lower φ (see sensitivity analysis reported in columns 3-6 in Tables 8 and 9).   
 Our model produces the near zero persistence in the first differenced exchange rates.  
The persistence of the Hodrick-Prescott filtered exchange rates and price ratio is a little lower 
in the model than is found in the data.  The latter result is similar to that produced by the 
model of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002).  Our model produces a lower correlation 
between real and nominal exchange rate than is found in the data with the baseline 
parameterization.   
The final set of results we report are about the forward rate unbiasedness puzzle and 
related forward market puzzles.  The results are in Table 10.  The estimate of the slope 
coefficient from regressing the spot change on the forward premium is –1.08.  This is 
approximately the average value we found in the data (see Table 4).  The ranking of the 
volatility of the spot change, the expected forward profit, the expected spot change and the 
forward premium are the same in the model as found in the data.  As mentioned above the 
standard deviation of the spot change is 6.36%, which similar to what is empirically 
observed.  The standard deviation of the expected forward profit is 0.97%, which is in the 
middle of the range of the estimates in Table 4.  The standard deviation of the forward 
premium is marginally lower than what we find in the data.  In the model the AR(1) 
coefficient of the spot change is 0.02 which is consistent with what is empirically found.  The 
AR(1) coefficient of the forward premium is 0.40 which is slightly lower than that found in 
the data.   
 
7. Conclusions  
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This paper has proposed a modelling strategy that makes substantial progress towards 
resolving many of the outstanding exchange rate puzzles.  A model that combines Campbell 
and Cochrane (1999) habit persistence defined over individual goods in a monetary 
framework is capable of explaining the disconnect between nominal exchange rates and 
fundamentals, the forward bias puzzle, the Meese-Rogoff puzzle and of mimicking the 
volatilities of real exchange rates, nominal exchange rates, the forward premium, expected 
spot returns and expected forward profits.   
The model, proposed here, still has limitations.  Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw 
(2005) have demonstrated empirically that forward interest rates forecast future spot interest 
rates and inflation rates, and that differentials of these forward rates forecast movements in 
exchange rates.  The model needs to be extended to explore that issue.  It also only describes 
an exchange economy.  Both Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) and Chari, McGrattan and 
Kehoe (2002) model production economies.  We need a very different model to intelligently 
assess the impact of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habits on other business cycle properties.  
Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) have pointed out that there are problems in expanding their 
framework to a production economy.  ‘Consumption bunching’ rather than consumption 
smoothing becomes welfare optimal.  However, this only arises if the habit is internalised: 
our habit is strictly an externality.   
The model is explicitly concerned with floating exchange rate regimes.  Moore and 
Roche (2005) suggest that it may even be able to explain the puzzle as to why real exchange 
rates were less volatile during the Bretton Woods period.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) see 
this as an example of the “Baxter-Stockman neutrality of exchange rate regime puzzle”.  
There is a striking increase in the volatility of the cross-good difference of the log surplus 
consumption ratio between the fixed and floating rate periods.  The corresponding change in 
the volatility of the ‘fundamentals’ is not nearly so noticeable, as Flood and Rose (1999) have 
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already observed.  It would appear that our model goes some distance to explaining the 
increase in volatility in the floating over the fixed rate period.  In the microstructure 
literature, Hau (1998), Killeen, Lyons and Moore (2006) and Jeanne and Rose (2002) show 
how regime-dependent volatility can be explained by endogenous changes in the foreign 
exchange market microstructure.  For these writers, an exchange rate regime change has real 
effects because it alters the real functioning of markets.  They see the difference between a 
fixed and floating rate regime as being a real and not a monetary phenomenon.  This is 
consistent with our outlook.  However, the challenge for the microstructure approach to 
foreign exchange markets is to reconcile their results with macroeconomic general 
equilibrium analyses such as the one developed here.  Evans and Lyons (2005) have made 
substantial progress down that road. 
The claims being made in this paper are very traditional.  Rather than use 
contrivances such as sticky prices and arbitrarily set trade costs, we insist on accounting for 
exchange rate puzzles using an optimising framework.  The desired results emanate from a 
carefully selected preference specification.  We invoke Occam's Razor to support our 
approach. 
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Table 1 
Relative RMSE of the monetary model in out-of-sample forecasting in the data 
 Canadian 
Dollar 
Japanese 
Yen 
Swiss 
Franc 
German 
Mark 
Forecast Horizon k     
1 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.01 
4 0.81 0.98 0.93 1.10 
8 0.63 1.01 1.02 1.87 
12 0.65 1.17 1.01 2.52 
16 0.55 1.40 1.13 2.90 
Note to the table: These results are taken from Table 1 in Faust, Rogers and Wright (2003).  
The entries in the table show the ratio of the out-of-sample RMSE from the monetary model 
to that of the driftless random walk model using real-time data.  The exchange rates are 
versus the U.S. dollar. 
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Table 2 
Properties of exchange rates and consumer price indices in Hodrick-Prescott filtered data  
 CAD/ 
USD 
GBP/ 
USD 
JPY/ 
USD 
CHF/ 
USD 
EUR/ 
USD 
CAD/ 
EUR 
GBP/ 
EUR 
JPY/ 
EUR 
CHF/ 
EUR 
Volatility %          
Price ratio 1.05 1.59 1.65 1.36 1.31 0.98 1.72 1.36 0.97 
Nominal exchange rate  3.42 7.96 9.37 8.75 8.71 9.22 6.09 8.13 2.42 
Real exchange rate 3.53 7.69 9.28 8.74 8.50 9.20 6.83 7.98 2.40 
          
Persistence          
Price ratio 0.89 0.79 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.80 
Nominal exchange rate  0.80 0.79 0.72 0.76 0.77 0.73 0.78 0.64 0.78 
Real exchange rate 0.79 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.63 0.76 0.76 
          
Cross-correlations          
Real and nominal exchange rate 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.97 
Notes to the table:  The data were obtained from Datastream International.  The sample period for Canadian dollar, British pound, 
Japanese yen and euro spot exchange rates is 1973:1-2005:4.  The sample period for the Canadian dollar, British pound and euro 
forward exchange rates is 1976:2-2005:4.  The sample period for the Japanese yen forward exchange rates is 1978:3-2004:4. The 
sample period of the Swiss franc spot and forward exchange rates is 1984:1-2005:4.  The deutschmark is used to proxy for the euro 
prior to 1999:1.  Volatility is measured by the standard deviation and persistence is measure by the first-order autocorrelation 
coefficient. 
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Table 3 
Properties of exchange rates and consumer price indices in first-differenced data 
 CAD/ 
USD 
GBP/ 
USD 
JPY/ 
USD 
CHF/ 
USD 
EUR/ 
USD 
CAD/ 
EUR 
GBP/ 
EUR 
JPY/ 
EUR 
CHF/ 
EUR 
Volatility %          
Price ratio 0.55 1.20 1.07 0.78 0.61 0.59 1.12 0.98 0.84 
Nominal exchange rate  2.51 5.19 6.25 6.68 6.28 6.51 4.72 5.54 2.10 
Real exchange rate 2.54 5.23 6.29 6.69 6.33 6.54 4.72 5.54 2.11 
          
Persistence          
Price ratio 0.47 0.29 0.32 0.40 0.59 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.56 
Nominal exchange rate  0.13 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.14 -0.03 0.07 
Real exchange rate 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
          
Cross-correlations          
Real and nominal exchange rate 0.98  0.97  0.99 0.99  0.99 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.98 
Notes to the table:  see notes to Table 2.    
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Table 4 
Properties of forward and spot exchange rates in the data 
 CAD/ 
USD 
GBP/ 
USD 
JPY/ 
USD 
CHF/ 
USD 
EUR/ 
USD 
CAD/ 
EUR 
GBP/ 
EUR 
JPY/ 
EUR 
CHF/ 
EUR 
Point estimate of b1 -0.48 -1.23 -2.61 -1.68 -0.55 -0.33 -0.24 -1.61 -0.63 
Covariance % -0.11 -1.11  -3.51 -1.32 -0.44 -0.17 -0.13 -0.91 -0.03 
          
Volatility %          
Spot return 2.51 5.19 6.25 6.68 6.28 6.51 4.72 5.54 2.10 
Expected forward profit  0.63 1.50 2.44 1.80 1.19 0.89 0.88 1.35 0.36 
Expected spot return 0.20 0.83 1.76 1.13 0.42 0.22 0.17 0.83 0.14 
Forward discount 0.43 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.76 0.67 0.70 0.51 0.22 
          
Persistence          
Spot return 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.03  0.06 0.07 0.06 0.14 -0.03 
Forward discount 0.74 0.78 0.77 0.93 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.82 0.62 
Notes to the table:  see notes to Table 2.  The coefficient b1 is estimated from regressing the spot return on the lagged forward 
premium.  The covariance is between the expected forward profit and the expected spot return.  The expected forward profit is 
calculated as the fitted value from regressing realized forward profits on the lagged forward premium.  The expected spot return is 
calculated as the fitted value from regressing realized spot returns on the lagged forward premium.   
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Table 5 
Baseline parameterization 
 Consumption 
growth 
Money growth Other 
parameters 
Unconditional mean 0.4725 1.36  
AR(1) coefficient 0.00 0.1  
Standard deviation of shock 0.75 0.946  
    
Discount factor β  0.99 
Curvature of the utility function γ  0.5 
AR1 coefficient of log surplus consumption φ  0.999 
Parameter in steady state surplus consumption δ  -0.005 
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Table 6 
Relative RMSE of the monetary model in out-of-sample forecasting in the theoretical 
economy 
 Baseline γ=0.7 δ=-0.0025 ρπ=0 φ=0.995 
Forecast Horizon k      
1 1.02 
(0.002) 
1.03 
(0.002) 
1.02 
(0.002) 
1.03 
(0.002) 
1.02 
(0.003) 
4 1.09 
(0.007) 
1.09 
(0.007) 
1.07 
(0.005) 
1.10 
(0.007) 
1.07 
(0.008) 
8 1.18 
(0.015) 
1.18 
(0.015) 
1.15 
(0.011) 
1.19 
(0.015) 
1.14 
(0.014) 
12 1.27 
(0.023) 
1.28 
(0.025) 
1.24 
(0.019) 
1.28 
(0.024) 
1.21 
(0.020) 
16 1.36 
(0.029) 
1.38 
(0.033) 
1.33 
(0.026) 
1.37 
(0.030) 
1.29 
(0.028) 
Notes to the table: The mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the statistic is based 
on 1000 simulations of 132 observations.   
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Table 7 
Percentage number of rejections 
 Baseline γ=0.7 δ=-0.0025 ρπ=0 φ=0.995 
tz  unit root test 20.70 15.20 14.80 20.70 27.20 
ˆte  unit root test 45.40 35.40 36.20 45.20 37.40 
Wald test 71.80 80.70 81.20 72.00 76.20 
Notes to the table:  The results are based on 1000 simulations of 132 observations.   
We define  as . The residuals  are obtained by estimating 
 by FM-OLS.  The unit root test is an augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test where the lag length in the test regression is chosen by reduction methods.  
The Wald test is a test of the joint null hypothesis  H
tz
1 2 1 2( ) ( )t t t tc c m m s− − + − − t
te
ˆte
1 2 1 2
0 1 2( ) ( )t t t t ts c c m m= α + α − + α − +
0:α1 = γ-1 and α2 = 1. 
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Table 8 
Properties of exchange rates and consumer price indices in Hodrick-Prescott filtered data in 
the theoretical economy 
 Baseline γ=0.7 δ=-0.0025 ρπ=0 φ=0.995 
Volatility %      
Price ratio 2.25 
(0.009) 
2.25 
(0.009) 
2.25 
(0.009) 
2.14 
(0.008) 
2.25 
(0.009) 
Nominal exchange rate  7.98 
(0.290) 
 9.28 
(0.256) 
6.77 
(0.180) 
7.91 
(0.291) 
10.57 
(0.293) 
Real exchange rate 7.90 
(0.308) 
9.65 
(0.269) 
6.95 
(0.197) 
7.90 
(0.308) 
11.02 
(0.302) 
      
Persistence      
Price ratio 0.72 
(0.002) 
0.72 
(0.002) 
0.72 
(0.002) 
0.69 
(0.002) 
0.72 
(0.002) 
Nominal exchange rate  0.70 
(0.003) 
0.69 
(0.003) 
0.70 
(0.003) 
0.68 
(0.003) 
0.68 
(0.003) 
Real exchange rate 0.66 
(0.003) 
0.67 
(0.003) 
0.67 
(0.003) 
0.66 
(0.003) 
0.67 
(0.003) 
      
Cross-correlations      
Real and nominal  
exchange rate 
0.55 
(0.015) 
0.76 
(0.010) 
0.65 
(0.013) 
0.55 
(0.015) 
0.89 
(0.005) 
Notes to the table: see Table 6.   
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Table 9 
Properties of exchange rates and consumer price indices in first-differenced data in the 
theoretical economy  
 Baseline γ=0.7 δ=-0.0025 ρπ=0 φ=0.995 
Volatility %      
Price ratio 1.71 
(0.003) 
1.71 
(0.003) 
1.71 
(0.003) 
1.70 
(0.003) 
1.71 
(0.003) 
Nominal exchange rate  6.36 
(0.232) 
7.42 
(0.203) 
5.38 
(0.143) 
6.36 
(0.232) 
8.48 
(0.233) 
Real exchange rate 6.37 
(0.245) 
7.79 
(0.212) 
5.59 
(0.155) 
6.37 
(0.245) 
8.89 
(0.239) 
      
Persistence      
Price ratio 0.05 
(0.003) 
0.05 
(0.003) 
0.05 
(0.003) 
-0.01 
(0.003) 
0.05 
(0.003) 
Nominal exchange rate  0.02 
(0.004) 
0.01 
(0.004) 
0.02 
(0.004) 
-0.02 
(0.004) 
-0.01 
(0.004) 
Real exchange rate -0.03 
(0.004) 
-0.02 
(0.004) 
-0.02 
(0.004) 
-0.04 
(0.004) 
-0.02 
(0.004) 
      
Cross-correlations      
Real and nominal 
exchange rate 
0.58 
(0.014) 
0.78 
(0.009) 
0.67 
(0.012) 
0.58 
(0.014) 
0.91 
(0.004) 
Notes to the table: see Table 6.   
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Table 10 
Properties of forward and spot exchange rates in the theoretical economy 
 Baseline γ=0.7 δ=-0.0025 ρπ=0 φ=0.995 
% of negative slope coefficients 55.30 66.80 56.50 92.30 78.70 
% of negative covariances  79.10  83.80  80.80  99.00  90.90 
Point estimate of b1 -1.08 
(0.089) 
-1.99 
(0.110) 
-1.34 
(0.110) 
-27.95 
(2.188) 
-2.43 
(0.100) 
Covariance % -2.31 
(0.198) 
-2.03 
(0.144) 
-0.78 
(0.064) 
-2.60 
(0.204) 
-3.28 
(0.239) 
      
Volatility %      
Spot return 6.36 
(0.232) 
7.42 
(0.203) 
5.38 
(0.143) 
6.36 
(0.232) 
8.48 
(0.233) 
Expected forward profit  0.97 
(0.045) 
1.02 
(0.038) 
0.59 
(0.024) 
1.15 
(0.044) 
1.35 
(0.048) 
Expected spot return 0.78 
(0.036) 
0.84 
(0.032) 
0.51 
(0.021) 
0.95 
(0.036) 
1.07 
(0.040) 
Forward discount 0.30 
(0.010) 
0.26 
(0.006) 
0.18 
(0.003) 
0.22 
(0.011) 
0.34 
(0.010) 
      
Persistence      
Spot return 0.02 
(0.004) 
0.01 
(0.004) 
0.02 
(0.004) 
-0.02 
(0.004) 
-0.01 
(0.004) 
Forward discount 0.40 
(0.011) 
0.46 
(0.011) 
0.33 
(0.009) 
0.82 
(0.006) 
0.51 
(0.011) 
Notes to the table: see Table 6.   
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Appendix A1: Solving the Optimization Problem 
 
From the first order18 conditions 19, we can solve for the real exchange rate:  
 
2 2 2
1 1 1
( )
( )
t t t t
t
t t t
S P C XR
P C X
γ
γ
−
−= =  (A1) 
From the households’ choice of state contingent bonds, we may define a risk-free nominal 
bond price in domestic currency:   
 
1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
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( )( , )
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t
t t t
t t t t
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C X Pq Q E
C X P
γ
γ
τ
τ τ β
+
−
+ +
+ −
∈Τ +
⎡ ⎤= = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  (A2) 
Similarly, the risk-free nominal bond price in foreign currency is : 
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2 2 2
2 2 1 1
1 2 2 2
1
( )( , )
( )
t
t t t
t t t t
t t t
C X Pq Q E
C X P
γ
γ
τ
τ τ β
+
−
+ +
+ −
∈Τ +
⎡ ⎤= = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  (A3) 
Using the cash in advance constraints (8) we can factor out prices to express the 
nominal exchange rate (A1) as: 
 
2 2 1 2 1 2 1
1 1 2 1 1 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
t t t t t t
t
t t t t t t
C X P C X MS
C X P C X M
γ γ
γ γ
− − −
− − −= =
γ
γ
                                                
 (A4) 
 
 
18 It is easy to show that the problem is a reparameterisation of the fuller problem that either includes the two 
cash in advance constraints (8) or replaces consumption with money as the control variable.  Money is 
reintroduced later by replacing prices with their values implied by the cash in advance constraints. 
19 Recall that the habit is external.  This idea is implemented by treating the surplus consumption ratio as 
exogenous in the optimization problem. 
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Appendix A2: Real and Nominal Exchange Rates 
 
Taking logged first differences of (A4) the spot return is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 21 1 1 1 1 11t t t t t t t ts s c c x x m mγ γ+ + + + + +− = − − Δ − Δ + Δ − Δ + Δ − Δ 1+  (A5) 
Equation (A5) can be written as: 
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 (A6) 
from which, we have: 
 ( ) 22 2 2 2 21 22 (1 ) 11 ut t x vVar s s Xπ
σ φ γ σ σρ+
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− = + − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
γ  (A7) 
The last expression is obtained from the fact that:  
 ( )( ) ( )( )2 211 and 1jtE x E x 1jtX Xλ λ+ = + =  (A8) 
Similarly, taking logged first differences of (A1), the change in the real exchange rate is: 
 ( ) ( )1 2 1 21 1 1 1t t t t t tr r c c x xγ γ+ + + +− = Δ −Δ + Δ −Δ 1+  (A9) 
from which, we have: 
 ( ) 22 2 2 21 2 (1 )t t x vVar r r X
γφ γ σ σ+
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− = − +⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎟⎟  (A10) 
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Appendix A3: Expressions for the Forward Premium,  
Expected Spot Return and Expected Forward Profit 
 
The domestic and foreign nominal interest rates are obtained easily.  Using the cash in 
advance constraints (8) we obtain from (A2) and (A3): 
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This yields: 
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Using the properties of the lognormal distribution on (A12): 
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The first line in equation (A13) represents the real bond price which is the negative of the 
expression for the log real risk free interest rate in Campbell and Cochrane (1999).  A first-
order Taylor series expansion to the square root function (11) around the steady state given by 
(12) is: 
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Using equation (12) and (A14) in (A13) gives the following expression for log bond prices: 
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Equation (A15) can be simplified to: 
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where the constant, α ,  is given by: 
 ( ) 21 2ln (1 ) (1 ) 1 1
2
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γα β γ μ ρ π γ φ δ σ σ 2u  (A17) 
and the parameter governing the  sensitivity of nominal bond prices, θ , to the surplus 
consumption ratio is: 
 
 ( )1vθ δ σ γ φ δ⎡ ⎤= − + − −⎣ ⎦  (A18) 
 
Using (16) and (A15) the forward discount equals: 
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 (A19) 
Taking time t conditional expectations of (A5) the expected spot return is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 21 1t t t t t t tE s s x x m mπγ φ ρ+ − = − − − + Δ − Δ  (A20) 
The expected forward profit is obtained by subtracting (A20) from (A19): 
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The coefficient on the log surplus consumption differential, ( )1γ φ θ− + , is positive since 
( )1γ φ δ− >  and /X γ  is less than unity because it is the inverse of the goods-specific 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.  We assume that this is greater than one.   
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Appendix A4: Second Moments for the Forward Premium,  
Expected Spot Return and Expected Forward Profit 
 
Using (A20) the unconditional variance of the expected spot change is: 
 ( )( ) 2 2 2 21 22 (1 )1 ut t t xVar E s s π π
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 (A22) 
Using (A19) the unconditional variance of the forward discount is: 
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Using  (A21) the unconditional variance of the expected forward profit is: 
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The covariance between expected forward profits (A21) and the expected spot return (A20) 
is: 
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(A25) 
From the remarks following (A21), we know that ( )1γ φ θ− +  is positive and therefore the 
covariance (A25) is negative. 
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The coefficient in the Fama regression, equation (4) is: 
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